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No One Tells You This:
Secondary Orality and Hypertextuality
Michael Joyce
No one tells you this: virus is a boundary condition, by definition on
the threshold between simple microorganism or extremely complex
molecule, atomic form or living thing, imminence or existence.  The notion
of virus itself is viral: in hospitals there are creatures, once one of us, whose
very limbs are gnawed by subcontinental viruses, self-devouring anti-selves.
Similarly there are forms embedded in e-mail letters (or what once were
letters, missives, messages, conversations would beg this question—no one
tells you this) poised likewise, likewise autophagous.  Wasn’t language
always this?  Isn’t it?
What follows is a somewhat autophagous essay on secondary orality
in the form of a virus or counter-fugue or a list or a (hypertext) (narrative).
You may think of it as overlay, as echolalia.
Let us begin with an orthodoxy, molecule already gone over to
organism, this from Doug Brent, one of the more thoughtful rhetoricians
engaged with electronic textuality (1997):
Fast modems, cheap(er) connections and (relatively) easy html editors are
beginning to do for webtext what Ong claims the phonetic alphabet did for
writing: transforming a complex and elitist form into a communication
tool that any schoolchild can master.  Many, including myself, have
argued that this form will revolutionise reading and writing in positive
ways congruent with the postmodern view of discourse.  But I am not
convinced that these sunny predictions about hypertext, including my
own, have asked all of the really tough questions that need to be asked . . .
in this transformed textual world.
Brent seems here to have in mind the core of Walter Ong’s extension of Eric
Havelock’s thought, that separation of “the knower from the known”
wherein “writing makes possible increasingly articulate introspectivity,
opening the psyche as never before” (1982:105).  Yet he and, as will be
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seen, the field in general—which is to say rhetoricians, pedagogists,
theorists, artists, and other practitioners of electronic literacy—seem caught
in a curiously doubled (not to say contradictory, but rather, as befits the
field, multiple) argument: the opening of the psyche to articulated
introspection is itself a sort of elitism, one that dismantles a more
participatory—nay even interactive—communicative structure in favor of
particulate, not to say fragmented, isolation.
Gathering haecceity is easy in electronic literacy.  Search and select,
cut and paste, or drag and drop, any schoolchild is its master, though I am
less sure than Brent that the latent democracy of textuality enables an easy
mastery of introspectivity to either schoolchild or teacher.  Indeed, there is
something of a conundrum, an almost mathematical riddle, involved in an
argument that the movement from orality to literacy to the digital presents
progressively less complex and elitist forms.
I, too, am not yet convinced that the sunny predictions about
hypertext, including my own (1995, 2000), have adequately foreseen the
nature of the transformation of the textual world.  It is clear that the near
afterthought of Ong’s notion of secondary orality has lingered along the
bounds of digital discourse like a virus, without, I think, ever completely
taking hold.  To inquire into why that is may offer some insight into the
current state of electronic (a term I prefer to digital) literature as well as, one
hopes, interrogate and indeed affirm the continued usefulness of Ong’s
thinking as electronic literacy emerges into what I have called elsewhere
post-hypertextuality, as well as into whatever maturing literacy may follow
the post-dot.com market boom and bust here on the slope of the new
millennium.
What I have in mind is something of the kind of homeostatic
retrospective genealogies that Ong himself lists among the hallmark
psychodynamics of orality, wherein “the part of the past with no
immediately discernible relevance to the present had simply fallen away
[and] the present imposed its own economy upon past remembrances”
(1982:48).  Whether such a process can tease out the nature of the present
economy is, of course, exactly the method and intent of Foucault’s
methodology, which so exasperated Father Ong, a fine historian, on account
of its concern with “correcting modern views rather than . . . explaining the
past on its own terms” (166).
I am neither a historian nor a (new, old, or post-) historicist, but rather
a mere artist (worse a post-modern artist; worse still, if not worst, a pre post-
hypertextualist).  Yet this inquiry of mine (already itself self-referentially
poised on the viral cusp between argument and narrative, simple
microorganism or extremely complex molecule) to some extent addresses
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itself to the call for a renewed literary history that falls among the first of
Ong’s so-called “theorems” from 1982.  His closing chapter in Orality and
Literacy proposed the theorems as something of a conventional coda hewing
closely to the protocol of academic discourse so dear to dissertation directors
and university press editors: review of literature, argument, augmentation of
prior knowledge, suggestions for further research.  It was a research agenda
that might be best understood as in the form of a catalogue of ships in Ong’s
sense of the same in the Iliad as “not an objective tally but an operational
display” (99).
It was a research agenda that would soon be overtaken by the actual
(or, in the oxymoron I am fond of, actual virtual) technologizing of the word
that the then quaintly termed “computer revolution” worked in ways Ong
could not have imagined.
Indeed, who could?  Ten years after Orality and Literacy the world
wide web sprung born from whatever hydra or godhead spawned it.
Seventeen years before its publication, that hydra had been named hypertext
by Ted Nelson (then briefly at Vassar during years when Eric Havelock
roamed this campus and, according to the published evidence, each of them
chatting at times with a then young Dante scholar, now also become a
Vassar hypertext creator, John Ahern, whom Ong also cites several times,
the world of academic orality and literacy, then and now still a small village,
its time “empathetic and participatory rather than objectively distanced”
[Ong 1982:45] even now).  Twenty-two years after that baptism and five
years after Ong’s book I published my own putatively “first” hypertext novel
at the actually first-ever ACM international hypertext conference in Chapel
Hill, a meeting that saw its own catalogue of however leakily launched
firsts, from Hypercard to my novel afternoon.
This particular homeostatic genealogy is, of course, meant to suggest
that Ong himself was in media res of an epic development he both could and
could not have seen.  Did and did not, in fact.
In some sense Ong, like many of us, saw it coming in the way Coyote
sees Roadrunner coming in the cartoon, a speck on the horizon instantly
becomes a typhoon and then a dusty cloud you are left run over by and lying
in.  All you have left are stars in your eyes, footprints on your forehead, and
the echo of a beep-beep.
Reading Ong somewhere between 1984 and 1988 (a place that was
not of course a place at all but rather an event until the development of print
as Ong would remind us) when I met her, the hypertext writer, Carolyn
Guyer (truly a reader imbued with what Ong calls “residual orality”—the
entire white space at the bottom of the page (77) following Ong’s use of the
phrase “spatial reductionism” in her copy is filled with a long chirographic
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note that begins, “Have you invented this term or is it a standing concept?
Either way, I question it . . .”—so much for Plato’s objection to
unchallengeable writing in the Phaedrus!), wrote another note of marginalia
(though clearly not a marginal note in her eyes or mine as I read her copy of
the text preparing this essay) next to, and contesting, the following sentence
of Ong’s, which she had bracketed (1982:130):
Print eventually reduced the appeal of iconography in the management of
knowledge, despite the fact that the early ages of print put iconographic
illustrations into circulation as they had never been before.
“We may have interiorized print (text) deeply,” Guyer writes in her note,
“but not to the extent that we don’t think visually (iconographically).  In ’82
you wouldn’t have known about the Mac” (n.d.) she tells him or herself and
now me and you, whoever either of us may be.
Another way to say it is that what overtook Ong’s research agenda
was his vision and the uses it was put to.  Ong’s thinking situated itself
within both a viral rhetoric and a cyclic narrative worthy of the epic
rhapsodist that has raged unabated from the dawning horizon of
hypertextuality to the twilight of the dot.com gods.  Secondary orality takes
its place among loci communes in the double sense of “analytic and
cumulative” commonplaces Ong identifies as “keeping alive the old oral
feeling” (111).
It is interesting to track the rise and fall of these commonplaces
through the flurry of citations in three successive and vastly influential
books by arguably the leading rhetorician and theorist of hypertextuality and
new media, Jay David Bolter.  In Turing’s Man: Western Culture in the
Computer Age (1984), an extraordinary survey and vision of the emergence
of the computer, there are no indexed instances of citations of Ong, although
Ramus’ Method and the Decay of Dialogue (1958) is cited in the bib.  There
are two indexed references to orality, one citing Vico and the ancients and
another, quite tellingly (pun intended) in a sub-section titled “Silent
Structures,” which makes the claim that “we have developed steadily away
from oral culture” and toward the computer “where symbols are drained of
connotations and given meaning solely by initial definition and by syntactic
relations with other symbols” (145).  It is worth noting in passing that in his
justly influential “yellow book” of hypertext, Hypertext: The Convergence
of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology (1992), George Landow
contests as mistaken Ong’s nearly identical claim that “the sequential
processing and spatializing of the word, initiated by writing and raised to a
new order of intensity by print, is further intensified by the computer” (Ong
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1982:136).  Needless to say, none of the three could quite anticipate the
complex syntactical intermixtures and flows of moving and still, silent and
voiced, fractal and morphed, evanescent and recurrent image and text whose
symbolic structures confront us in electronic media.
Obviously one may argue that Bolter’s book emerges in the shadow of
Ong’s, and if not precisely in the same season as it, then at least before its
fruit had ripened and its seeds dispersed.  Indeed by Bolter’s Writing Space:
The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing (1991), there are six
citations of Ong, including both a discussion of “Writing and analysis,”
(208-10) that extends to a consideration of both Jack Goody and David
Olson, as well as the prominent inclusion of Ong in Bolter’s own somewhat
compressed version of the conventional research agenda cum homeostatic
genealogy that appears as the coda to Writing Space (239):
What is still needed . . . is a text that combines the research of the
historians of writing (Sampson, Diringer) with the work on oral theory of
Havelock and Ong (as corrected and supplemented by Olson, Finnegan,
Goody, and other sociologists and anthropologists) and further with the
work of Derrida and other post-modern theorists.  The study of
information technologies (by Beninger, 1986 and others) must also be
included.
Here again, in the midst of this non-historical and non-historicist narrative of
history, it is worth looping forward (and back) to (and from) Landow to note
his speculation on Ong’s claim, following Plato, that “books, unlike their
authors, cannot really be challenged” (Landow 1992:83).  In suggesting the
ability of hypertext to challenge the unchallengeable text, Landow asks, “If
hypertext situates text in a field of other texts, can any individual work that
has been addressed by another still speak so forcefully?” (idem).  That is, he
argues that instantaneous intertextuality itself is something of a challenge to
centrality, especially to the degree that the equal weight given citation and
main text on the computer screen levels their appearance and importance.
Thus it is not surprising that linked to the above-cited coda in the
hypertext version of Bolter’s Writing Space (Landow’s books have hypertext
versions as well)—a text distributed free of charge and separately from the
academic publishing of the printed book (and thus doubly outside the
economy of scholarly discourse)—he writes (Bolter, Joyce, and Smith
1987:n.p.):
Or do we need such a history?  Does not the very notion of a history that
combines and reconciles the two streams belong to the technology of print,
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which demands a single analytic thread—stability and a unified point of
view.
To be sure, there is no one to answer his question in this text, although I am
obliged to report that in the particular copy of the hypertext version I
consulted for this essay, there were anonymous contributions, including
commentary and additions from the field of other texts, most likely left there
by a student of mine from some past class.
We learn from leavings.  My own stack of books flaps a hundred
wings like irradiated dragonflies, a hundred (a mythical number, an icon for
number) narrow neon post-it notes tabbing my catalogue of Ong citations in
various texts and my citations of those texts alike, that is, the container and
the contained at once.
(Two parenthetical, paradoxical parables of space and time: At a
hypertext conference once I shared, mostly silently, a dormitory suite at a
college in Maine with Ted Nelson, the baptizer of hypertext.  I could not fail
to notice that his daybooks flapped similarly with—literally—hundreds of
such tabs.  I later learned that he added cross references to these tabs, linking
tab to tab and tab to page and page to tab by scribbled annotations on actual
note papers.  Still later—at another conference, this time a Marriott or
Ramada—no one could fail to notice that Nelson videotaped every moment
of his exchanges, public and private, with others, doing so in what is called
“real time.”  In a variation of the Zenonian paradox, a wag wondered how he
would know when to stop, “I mean he’ll have to stop at a point where the
duration of the tapes equals the time he has left to live in order to be able to
watch it all.”)
Two catalogues (non-parenthetical):
[1] The literate mind is analytic; the oral mind is aggregative.  The literate
mind is objective; the oral mind is traditional and unable to detach itself
from its context. . . .  The difference that literacy makes, is evident in a
culture’s “texts.”  Oral cultures produce poems, stories, mythology, lore,
and dramatic performances; they do not produce philosophic essays,
technical studies, scientific treatises, or textbooks of higher mathematics.
Oral cultures do not send out anthropologists to study literate cultures and
explain the differences between orality and literacy. (Bolter 1991:208-9).
[2] [M]embers of the Chicago School, notably Robert Park, Earnest
Burgess, and Roderick McKenzie, developed a sociological approach to
the study of cities and communities, which they referred to as human
ecology [which held that] technologies of communication . . . are
essential, often defining components of any human environment.  One
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graduate of the Chicago School who took this lesson to heart was a
Canadian named Harold Innis [who] in turn laid the foundation for what is
sometimes known as the Toronto School, whose “membership” includes
Marshall McLuhan, Eric Havelock, and Edmund Carpenter.  Insofar as
“Toronto School” refers to a pattern of influence rather than strict
geographical location, membership is also extended to Walter Ong, Jack
Goody, and a number of other scholars, many of whom have studied
and/or taught in the New York metropolitan area; the list includes Louis
Forsdale, Tony Schwartz, Neil Postman, Gary Gumpert, John M. Phelan,
Joshua Meyrowitz, and Henry Perkinson.  It might in fact be more
accurate to talk about a combined Toronto-New York School.  Or, given
the fact that McLuhan and Carpenter spent a year teaching at Fordham
University, that Carpenter also taught at New York University, as did Ong,
it might make sense simply to talk about a New York School. (Strate
1996a:n.p.)
These catalogues, of course, are incommensurable.  Mere lists.  Following
the catalogue above Bolter cites Goody (Goody 1977:81, in Bolter
1991:209):
The list relies on discontinuity rather than continuity; it depends on
physical placement, on location; it can be read in different directions, both
sideways and downwards, up and down, as well as left and right; it has a
clear cut beginning and a precise end, that is, a boundary, an edge, like a
piece of cloth.  Most importantly it encourages the ordering of the items,
by number, by initial sound, by category, etc.  And the existence of
boundaries, external and internal, brings greater visibility to categories, at
the same time making them more abstract.
These catalogues, of course, are extensible.  More than lists.  Kathrine
Kveim (1998:n.p.) cites Ong:
Ong said that print commodified the word in that “[t]ypography had made
the world into a commodity.  The old communal oral world had split up
into privately claimed freeholdings.” (Ong 1982:131).  As in the
commodification of art and cultural products in the culture industries, this
clearly is transferred to the new media. The dialectic of the secondary
orality is seen in digitalisation’s resistance towards this sort of
containment.  Paradoxically, or dialectically, literate culture makes linear
digital programming possible but also makes the “word” lose its fixity in
space and belong to anyone—like the oral world that existed in the realm
of sound, uncontainable and evanescent (Ong 1982:5ff).
Certain words emerge from the substratum, cluster, coruscate:
boundary and container (the latter evident only to the reader who has paged
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forward to the title of the Strate citation).  (Some commodities: I know for a
fact that Bolter attended university in Toronto; I know by their spellings that
Brent and Kveim were educated in the commonwealth; I know from the
URL and institutional affiliation that Brent is at a Canadian university.  This
is the experimental part of this text.  This is an instance of rhetoric.  This is a
philosophic apostrophe.  At least one of the sentences before this cannot be
true.)
More, there is in the first two catalogues above the germ of difference
between the largely post-modernist and hypertextual view of orality that
Bolter represents and the largely late modernist and phenomenological view
that Strate represents.  Despite his characteristic scholarly calm and clarity
Bolter lists unfixed (aggregative), or at least counterposed, attributes,
divorced from any place or time except perhaps Ei(se)nsteinian literary
history.  Strate’s equally calm genealogy continues to recognize discrete
places, schools, lines of transmission, tradition, and, of and in course,
individual talent.  To be sure, both wish to situate Ongian orality vis-à-vis
electronic literacy, but the one offers a contextual plane upon which the
disappearing voice can be heard, while the other presents an ebb and flow of
minds and mind.  Kveim’s claim (we’ll hear it—actually read it—later here
made by writers prior to her text cited here) that the unfixing of the
commodified and containerized word in digitalized virtual space in fact
marks the distance between the two men’s lists.
The space marking the distance between is occupied by the virus and
the argument alike.  The space between is the link that participates in both
what was and will be, in imminence and existence (between imminence and
existence there is no between), that is, hypertext.
Doug Brent questions “whether hypertext is friendly to rhetoric, for it
presupposes an exchange of positions, each of which can be articulated as a
position in ways that hypertext may not allow for without denying its own
mandate as hypertext” (1997:n.p.).  He notes (idem) that
The waters are further muddied by confusions of terms. . . .  Philosophers
sometimes reserve the term “philosophy” for arguments intended to
establish a position, and speak of “rhetoric” (often with a tacit “mere” in
front of the term) as either discourse without rigorous intellectual
engagement, or as the superficial set of forms that the underlying series of
positions may take.
Yet in the course of trying to avoid “this largely semantic dispute” and
“clarify [his] own use of the terms as a rhetorician rather than as a
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philosopher,” Brent promptly walks into the swamp of orality and literacy
(idem):
Rhetoric is exploration (Oakeshott) or argument (Burke) for an audience.
The rhetor must consider how her arguments will work in a particular
context—particular readers, particular occasions, particular purposes. . . .
By this definition, when philosophers write down their philosophies for
others, they are doing rhetoric.  Aside from the ironic savour of this point,
it is important because it suggests that philosophers-as-rhetoricians (that
is, whenever they speak their philosophy) must consider the rhetorical
arrangement of their arguments.  This is not a trivial point when
considering whether hypertext is friendly to rhetoric.
It doesn’t seem clear whether Brent is clever or confused in the phrase
“whenever they speak their philosophy” or whether in the midst of an
earnest attempt to think through a boundary condition (between oral and
written argument forms as they determine or are altered by the web) he
merely means to wrangle philosophers into the rhetoricians’ corral
regardless of whether or not they are speaking or writing on the page or for
the web or in the public square.
Meanwhile Lester Faigley disputes Ong’s (and followers’)
“characterization of oral language as more paratactic and written language as
more hypotactic” as “little more than another folk belief that runs contrary to
actual practice,” citing research that suggests that “oral language is typically
more grammatically complex than written language” (1992:203).
This would, of course, suggest that a secondary orality—and even
more a written language infected by the uncontainable echolalia of the
same—might be even more complexly overlaid and layered.  That is surely
what hypertext writer and theorist J. Yellowlees Douglas must mean in her
snappish (and snappy) characterization of secondary orality on the second-
to-last, literally penultimate, page of The End of Books—Or Books without
End (2000:171), when she calls it “a superficial category that ignores the
script lurking behind every exchange of words on television or radio.”
It is possible that Douglas may have had in mind my own
characterization of the inherent overlay of hypermediated text (1995:110):
At first electronic writing appears to threaten the essential “thisness” of
text, yet whole cities are painted in it. . . .  [T]he everpleasant teevee, the
constant tube—pours forth a shimmer of transcendent text.  A newscaster
reporting the decline of literacy never considers the transitory nature of the
text which headlines that decline in the graphic over her shoulder—a
franchised graphic up and downlinked from the network in New York.
Nor does she consider the equally transitory nature of what she mouths, a
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script which has made its way from terminal to teleprompter to unheeding
air without benefit of paper. . . .  Later, the videotaped newscast may be
summoned within the text of an hypermedia system, and there the original
graphic may be frame-captured and optically scanned, and the recorded
audio digitally decoded, and broadcast turned back into text.  The
existence of any atom of literacy—text itself, the word “thisness,”
etc.—depends upon our interaction with it.
In any case by the time of the third Bolter book, Remediation (Bolter
and Grusin 2000), there are no Ong citations, none also for orality.  Which
might suggest that the word is fully remediated.
(“I’m all eyes,” as the saying goes.)
Indeed it can be argued, in passing, that secondary orality as a figure
for electronic textuality was overtaken by the visual.  Or, to put it more
exactly, the grammatological.  Sight trumps sound.
Ong’s own epigram “Sight isolates, sound incorporates” (1982:72) in
fact suggests a kind of trumping relationship, where the unfixed and
incorporated isolate assumes a higher, albeit solitary, status and power.
Ong’s remarks on Derrida in the final theorems of Orality and Literacy thus
conclude with dismissal of mere play (of signifiers) (1982:170):
L’ecriture and orality are both “privileged,” each in its own distinctive
way.  Without textualism, orality cannot even be identified; without
orality, textualism is rather opaque and playing with it can be a form of
occultism, elaborate obfuscation—which can be endlessly titillating, even
at those times when it is not especially informative.
Putting aside the obvious question of the difference between titillation and
information (i.e., if it feels good, know what?), the tonal aspects if not oral
dimensions of Derrida’s différance, sous rature, and borderless if not
endless traces that, at this distance, make the grammatological critique of the
phonocentric-logicentric episteme itself more porous an edge than the fabric
of difference that Goody imagines, more porous and more felt.  “Felt” in this
case can be understood in the ambiguous sense of both the emotional
boundary and the “anti-fabric” Deleuze and Guattari characterize in their
famous essay on the smooth and the striated (1983:475):
Felt is a supple solid product that proceeds altogether differently, as an
anti-fabric.  It implies no separation of threads, no intertwining, only an
entanglement of fibers obtained by fulling (for example, by rolling the
block of fibers back and forth).  What becomes entangled are the
microscales of the fibers.  An aggregate of intrication of this kind is in no
way homogeneous: it is nevertheless smooth, and contrasts point by point
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with the space of fabric (it is in principle infinite, open, and unlimited in
every direction; it has neither top nor bottom nor center; it does not assign
fixed and mobile elements but rather distributes a continuous variation).
Distributed, continuous variation evokes a sort of spaceless space
(indeed Deleuze and Guattari argue for something very like this in their
notion of deterritorialization) and problematizes Ong’s fundamental critique
of what he imagines to be (not to say mistakes as) the textualists’ “illusion
that logic is a closed system,” an architecture.  “Oral cultures,” Ong claims
(1982:169),
hardly had this kind of illusion, though they had others.  They had no
sense of language as “structure.”  They did not conceive of language by
analogy with a building or other object in space.  Language and thought
for the ancient Greeks grew out of memory.  Mnemosyne, not Hephaestus,
is the mother of the Muses.  Architecture had nothing to do with language
and thought.  For “structuralism” it does, by ineluctable implication.
It is the preacher and poet who sees the structure in structuralism (although it
seems a homilist’s conceit to fault the holy tinkerer Hephaestus in passing
for his lack of maternal qualities, and a literary scholar’s—lovely,
loving—conceit to echo James Joyce’s “ineluctable modality of the
visible”[1934:31]).
Jay Bolter and I called our microcomputer hypertext system, begun
three years after Ong’s book, Storyspace (Bolter, Joyce, and Smith 1987).
But building language into an object out in (cyber)space was not the
accomplishment of hypertext systems such as ours or those several others
before or after it that more often than not still saw themselves as children of
Mnemosyne.  Our Storyspace was meant as a Wunderkammer or memory
palace; its true predecessors were systems with names like Vannavar Bush’s
“Memex” or Douglas Engelbart’s “Augment,” suggesting how they were
meant to augment memory and intelligence, by either adding back or
keeping in place the traces of their making in Nelson’s hypertext text’s more
text than text.  Ong is this much right in his mythological attribution.  It was
instead a Hephaestian tinkerer’s system, an alchemist of text, born of
physicists (at CERN, an atomic physicist’s instititute in Switzerland), given
(graven) images in the fantasizing gleam of a boy’s eyes (Illinois graduate
student, Mark Andreesson, who left to found Netscape after devising the
way to show images in html, hypertext mark-up language), which turned
word to picture through a script lurking behind every exchange.
If the textualists prevailed over the oralists in winning the heart of
hypertext, it is not so much that Derrida had a six-year head start in a culture
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not likely to credit duration (and in fact more given to that old channel-
zapper Hermes than to Mnemosyne); nor entirely that Landow famously
(and unfortunately) declared hypertext a testbed for deconstruction (1992:3),
but rather that within a decade of Ong’s Orality and Literacy (the University
of Illinois’ Mosaic, the first web browser and precursor of Netscape, appears
in 1992) the web emerges, viz.
<a href= “Pretty as a picture”>
<img src= “Ut pictura, hyperpoesis”>
</a>
We will probably all feel better at this point if we can count (on) some
things.  Without indulging too much in what might already seem a parody of
a certain kind of quantitative research, it may nonetheless be (pardon the
term) illustrative to look at Ong citations in five collections of essays
regarding electronic literacy and pedagogy whose publication dates bracket
the emergence of the web.
In Delany and Landow’s 1991 collection, Hypermedia and Literary
Studies , there are five citations of Ong in three different essays.
Two—Bolter’s citation of Ong’s Ramus book in conjunction with his
discussion of “spatial arrangement of topics” (108) and John Slatin’s
inclusion of Ong with Havelock and Lanham as figures pointing to the
“point in history . . . when writing itself was a radically innovative
technology” (157)—are good, conventional scholarship that nonetheless
makes clear that Ong was to be considered in framing good, conventional
scholarship.  (Again risking a sort of parodistic move, it may be interesting
to note that Derrida is cited five times in two essays.)  Delany and Landow’s
introductory essay, however, engages Ong directly, not to say impolitely:
“Computers may re-create certain qualities of pre-literate culture more
pervasively than even Walter J. Ong has been willing to admit” (1991:12).
After citing Ong’s notion of secondary orality, they further cite and quarrel
with Ong’s insistence that “the sequential processing and spatializing of the
word . . . is further intensified by the computer, which maximizes
commitment of the word to (electronic) local motion, and optimizes analytic
sequentiality by making it virtually instantaneous” (136, cited in Delany and
Landow 1991:12).
Later hypertextual theorists (see below) will see hypertextual
instantaneity and complexity as the spatio-temporal equivalent of Ong’s
“sounded word,” which “exists only when it is going out of existence . . .
[and] is not simply perishable but essentially evanescent, and sensed as
evanescent” (1982:32).  However, Delany and Landow are at this early stage
a little more cautious, merely suggesting that “by inserting every text into a
web of relations, hypertext systems promote non-sequential reading and
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thinking and hence produce a very different effect” (1991:12).  Indeed, in a
sly move earlier in their essay, the author-editors had already inserted Ong’s
text in an earlier kind of hypertextuality, (textual) local motion, and
relational web, by citing him in a numbered footnote, though not in the main
text by name, following a sentence on the “stubborn materiality of text”
(ibid.:4) that in endnotes refers to their suggestion that “in oral cultures, of
course, the text had a quite different status in the mind, one that was closer
in some respects to the hypertextual model,” and this is followed by a
bibiliographic citation of Orality and Literacy.
In what seems rhetorical wiliness or perhaps paratactic rhetoric,
Delany and Landow, like Brent above, wrangle hypertextuality into orality’s
corral with an insistently oral diction (viz., the occurrence of “speak,”
“comments,” “dialogue,” and “voice” below) (ibid.:13):
But if hypertext fosters integration rather than self-containment, always
situating texts in a field of other texts, can any individual work that has
been addressed by another still speak so forcefully?  One can imagine
hypertext versions of books in which the reader could call up all the
reviews and comments on that book; the “main” text would end up
inevitably as part of a complex dialogue. . . .  [Hypertext] destroys one of
the most basic characteristics of the printed text: its separation and
univocal voice . . . [and] forces it to exist as part of a complex dialogue.
As a midway point in Landow’s unindexed 1994 collection,
Hyper/Text/Theory, still early in the academic publishing cycle for any
significant appearance of web citations, I count a half dozen Ong citations in
three essays, four of them clustered in a single one.
Hawisher and Selfe’s 1991 collection, Evolving Perspectives on
Computers and Composition Studies: Questions for the 1990’s, is something
of a high-water mark.  Fourteen citations of Ong (versus five of Derrida) in
six different essays (versus three) include a handful of good, conventional
citations but otherwise the tone is engaged, even critical, in essays from
pioneer scholar/teacher/theorists already in the days before the web and
before computers were used in a day-to-day sense not just as tools for
learning and teaching but as learning environments.  Nancy Kaplan
(1991:23) cites Richard Ohmann’s critique of what she calls Ong’s “famous
claim” for the new ways of thinking the computer offers.  “As the computer
revolution unfolds,” Kaplan writes, “Ohmann reminds teachers of English
that literacy has a history imbricated with technology and that ‘technology . .
. is itself a social process, saturated with the power relations around it,
continually reshaped according to some people’s intentions’ [Ohmann
1985:681].”  In a later essay in this collection Ruth Ray and Ellen Barton
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also summon Ohmann among others to critique the “technicist thinking” of
Ong and others, which they say “typically leads to the institutional
imperative, in which the technology contributes to the authority of the
institution by dictating what and how things will be done and how people
and things will be evaluated” (1991:282).  It should be said that Faigley
mounts a similar, even more powerful critique of how “secondary orality is
an unsatisfactory way of conceiving of an array of electronic
communications technologies. . . [which] have the paradoxical effects of
both helping to bring about commonality and at the same time social
division” (1992:204).
In another essay in the Hawisher and Selfe collection, hypertext
fiction writer and theorist, Stuart Moulthrop, reminds “teachers of writing. . .
face-to-screen with the technological future . . . that we have all been here
before” (1991:261).  In a catalogue of “readers of the postmodern scene”
who see both the return of “the fluidity and openness of preliterate culture”
(Ong) or even “announce a ‘techno-primitivism’ that embraces the power
and dynamism of technology but rejects its cult of rationality (Jean
Baudrillard, Arthur Kroker, David Cook),” Moulthrop reminds us of the
Frankenstein myth: “Print is ‘dead’ but like assorted poltergeists, ghouls,
aliens, and things-that-will-not-die in our horror movies. . . .  ‘Gutenberg
technology’ always rises again” (262).
Finally, in a careful, brilliantly laid-out, and elegant—as well as witty,
viz.: “although there can be no hard evidence for such assertions, one must
assume language to be of extreme antiquity” (1991:208)—essay, John
McDaid, also a hypertext writer and theorist as well as a media ecologist in
the lineage of Strate’s genealogy above, situates then current considerations
of secondary orality and mediation within that genealogy, offering a series
of  tables  “representing  correlations  between  media  and  their  social
impacts . . . derived from the work of Elizabeth Eisenstein, Eric Havelock,
Marshall McLuhan, Walter J. Ong, and Neil Postman” (208).  This son of
such a line does not shy away from criticizing Ong the father (209-10):
[T]he Greeks found themselves poorly served by the evanescence of
speech, just as we today find ourselves at a juncture where the linguistic
conceptions occasioned by day-to-day reality have broken down.  Unlike
prelinguistic symbols, which were inclusive potentials for meaning, oral
language cuts up the world and then exteriorizes it projecting it onto the
world as the way things ARE.  And language-level decisions about ‘the
way things are’ were formed at pretty low levels of sophistication. . . .
Conceptions formed in such media environments break down quickly
when operated at relativistic velocity or on a submicroscopic scale.
Language makes us good at billiards, bad at quantum tunneling . . .
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[which] may become a non-trivial issue as we discover which of these
skills, in the long run, is more important.
The world wide web is arguably still more like billiards than quantum
tunneling, but McDaid nonetheless sets the stage for an examination of
secondary orality at warp speed.  By the time of the next two collections I
consider here, the web is more or less here (wherever that is), and hypertext
has more or less become the web (before that point there were dozens of
largely local—that is, non-networked, micro-computer, and mostly text-
based—systems including our Storyspace, Apple’s Hypercard, and so on).
 Strate, Jacobson, and Gibson’s 1996 collection, Communication and
Cyberspace: Social Interaction in an Electronic Environment, and the
however incestuous (one identical editor, one ex-editor a contributor, yours
truly also, same press) Gibson and Oviedo 2000 collection, The Emerging
CyberCulture: Literacy, Paradigm, and Paradox, are very firmly of the
media ecology lineage that Strate and McDaid each outline above, the
editors and several contributors being former graduate students in Neil
Postman’s NYU media ecology program.  Thus, if only on account of
his—root sense—familiarity, Ong wins the citation contest hands-down:
twenty-four to three over Derrida in the 1996 author index, ten to four in the
subject index (that is, if you count “orality” as “Ong,” otherwise he’s not an
entry in the latter at all).  In the 2000 collection it’s twenty-three to zero in
the author, and fifteen to four in the subject (where “orality” does not appear
as an entry).
But something else is happening, a different contest, a differing
content: in the 1996 subject index there are five mentions of graphics, three
of graphic user interface (GUI), twelve of multimedia, eleven of
videogames, twenty-six of virtual reality, six of virtual sex, seven of the
world wide web, and thirty-some of the internet.  The numbers are similar
for the 2000 collection.  (By way of comparison there are four total listings
for multimedia in the Delaney and Landow and the Hawisher and Selfe
collections combined, none for the world wide web or internet)
It may be too much to say that Ong is incorporated into a larger
organism but not, I think, to suggest that his ideas seep across the viral
bounds, intermixing with other flows that permeate the emergence of a
hybridized, and as yet not fully identified, entity, or more properly
constantly evolving multiplicity.
In the 1996 Strate, Jacobson, and Gibson collection, Ong is evoked as
a vital, if not a viral, boundary figure, a measure of bounds.  His thinking is
brought to bear on what in his essay John Phelan (1996:42) calls “Secondary
Tribalism” (foreshadowed by Moulthrop above).  Meanwhile, Moulthrop in
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this collection (1996:250) discusses Ong in relation to hypertext on the
internet versus hypertext on closed systems including CD ROM; while
Strate meditates upon the possibility that a “new consciousness . . . may
emerge through a synthesis between our physical selves and the dream
selves we generate in cybertime” (1996b:373).  In a particularly rich
instance, in her essay “Charting the Codes of Cyberspace,” in a section
entitled “At the junction of orality and literacy,” Judith Yaross Lee considers
how “when interactive digital video merges with e-mail . . . [a]lthough this .
. . medium will almost certainly rely on familiar facial and body ‘language,’
users will find themselves in unfamiliar waters as they attempt, anew, to
chart its codes” (1996:293)  To this new encoding she summons as
progenitors (and likewise, one thinks, as wayward children) Ong and
Derrida, together (293-94):
Although he agrees with Derrida on almost nothing else, Walter Ong
noted . . . that writing by definition is “discourse that has been detached
from its author” [1982:78].  Not so for the e-mail writer. The electronic
text embodies the author—the virtual speaker who meets the reader, who
becomes embodied by a similar process in response.  Thus, although e-
mail derives from both writing and speech, it does not homogenize traits
from each other into a synthetic mixture or blend.  Rather, like a child, it
has some traits from one parent and some from the other, and the
combination has a life of its own.
The Gibson and Oviedo 2000 collection not surprisingly features both
as rich a range of situating Ong’s thinking and as earnest and organic a
summoning to the kind of dual-lineage hybridity that Lee outlines above.  In
the editor’s introduction, Stephanie Gibson imagines “a paradigmatic
possibility . . . that we may one day be less and less concerned with
preserving what we compose . . . [and] live more and more with the
constantly mutating text of Ong’s ‘present moment’” (10).  As warrant for
this claim she offers how “web pages change daily, sometimes even
momentarily . . . [leading] to altered relationships between writer, text, and
audience” (idem).  In what increasingly becomes a commonplace among
theorists of electronic literacy, Gibson offers the speed of (visual, textual)
communication as evidence of its sharing the gene of orality (10-11):
Electronic journals . . . have a much more rapid turn-around time than
traditional print journals, and they allow for a closer to real time dialogue
about their contents.  An article published in an online journal can be
debated in a much more lively fashion than one in a print journal—a
fashion closer to face-to-face debate.
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In a later essay contributor Sue Barnes says it baldly: “This instantaneous
characteristic turns the printed word into a more oral medium, the computer
replaces the voice as a communication channel.  The written word . . .
substitutes for the spoken word” (2000:193).
The ghost haunting these speedy arguments for the mutation of space
back into time is of course Paul Virilio (another—ghostly double—is
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of deterritorialization noted
above/earlier/once). That ghost walks the stage in Lance Strate’s dizzying
consideration of “Hypermedia, Space and Dimensionality,” wherein (during
which) the two finally are as pressed together—felt—as Deleuze and
Guattari’s heterogenous “aggregate of intrication” cited above.
“The point here is that hypertext and hypermedia are part of a much
larger phenomenon,” as Strate writes.  He continues (2000:277):
Time itself has long been spatialized through the linear metaphor of the
time line, the graph metaphor of the calendar page, and the circular
metaphor of the traditional clockface.  This tendency affects computing,
and is, in turn, affected by the computer, in whose memory banks
commodified historical information may be deposited or withdrawn.  The
flowchart, the fundamental diagram of computer programming, is a highly
spatialized representation of events unfolding in time, and has become a
key image in contemporary culture. . . .  It is branching and
multidimensional, but it is also spatialized and static in its layout.
Hypertextual time can be represented in this spatialized format, so the
reader may explore and navigate through a hypertextual network that links
representations of different moments or eras.  And while the general
tendency toward spatialization is a limiting factor, there is still a great deal
of readerly freedom that can be provided in this presentation of the
temporal dimension.
We will stay with Strate for another (last) long moment as he lays out
and explores another, rather abstracted, combined, and combinatorial
catalogue and genealogy, however not without first noting that what is most
striking in the preceding citation is the (Our) town square it evokes
ecphrastically.  The image, if not Habermas’s public sphere, complete with
bank and clock tower and rails or roads or riverbanks going somewhere,
evokes the HO-scale towns of model railway crossroads or—more likely for
a grown-up boy of Strate’s generation—the three-quarter-scale town center
of Main Street USA, Disneyland.  As the work of other equally nostalgic
would-be media visionaries like Lucas or Spielberg suggests, such a tiny
town is good to have in mind as one sets off into multidimensional narrative
universes such as those Strate suggests (ibid.:278), where
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What is significant . . . is not that they include the higher dimension of
time; after all, time is represented in traditional narrative and dramatic
forms from oral storytelling to the novel, and in audiovisual media.  Time
itself, however, tends to be presented as one-dimensional and generally
linear in these older forms, while computer software is more open to
multidimensional temporal modes.  Thus, it becomes feasible to represent
and to navigate through parallel time lines . . . or time lines that exist at an
angle to each other so that, from a vantage point on either line, events on
the other line would appear to be moving at a much faster rate
(MacBeath).  Two separate time dimensions could also move in opposite
directions from each other (Whitrow).  A computer mediated narrative can
easily present both objective time and a corresponding sense of subjective
time held by a human agent, which Herbert Zettl sees as equivalent to the
horizontal and vertical dimensions of space. Multiple dimensions of
subjective time could then be represented if more than one character is
involved.  Or we could construct and explore the links between the sacred
and profane temporal dimensions imagined by Mircea Eliade.
We are very far from Walter Ong by now.  We can hardly hear him
over this distance.  We are likewise far from the Lionel town, Disney’s land,
Habermas sphere, or even the village lights along the tracks of the thin,
liminal membrane where the virus resides, devouring or becoming us,
becoming to us.  Inevitably, unerringly, the media ecologist’s contextual
plane and the postmodernist ebb and flow of minds have not so much
merged as disappeared into the pixel-sized vanishing point of virtual parallel
lines.  It would be easy to have fun with Strate’s earnest description of
alternate dimensionalities and narratives if I hadn’t tried to imagine and
write them (for) myself.  It is pleasant for now to wonder who is MacBeath,
this cross between MacBeth and breath, or to imagine the kind of tweed
worn by a man named Herbert Zettl, and to wonder also whether he ever
runs into Whitrow (though it is a shock I confess to run into old friend
Eliade here in the mi(d)st—as much a father to me as Ong was once during
those long-ago years in my Jesuit college).  Aside from my fathers, Strate’s
list of names is unknown to me, uncited below because I prefer for now to
leave them so, less unknown than known by the stories the sounds of their
names raise: wearing tweed, moving through alleys, calling after Whitrow,
looking up at the spherical moon.
As I leave you, dear reader, for the present moment also.
Vassar College
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